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A court may award attorney fees to a prevailing party in a patent trial
under exceptional circumstances. Since 2005, courts had applied a rigid
formula to determine whether a case was exceptional. In the summer of
2014, the Supreme Court rejected this rigid test. Instead, the Court held
that an exceptional case is "simply one that stands out from others."
Finding a case exceptional, the Court said, was at the discretion of the
district court and only reviewable on appeal for an abuse of discretion.
A year and a half later, one interesting question is: How do district
courts now determine what cases are exceptional in the absence of a more
formulaic approach? The analysis of several cases decided soon after the
Supreme Court's decision reveals that district courts primarily analyze a
party's litigation position and litigation conduct to determine whether-
in its discretion-to award attorney fees. To a lesser degree, district
courts have also awarded attorney fees to deter infringement and unsa-
vory litigation practices.
However, the deterrence rationale has the potential to be problematic: its
purpose is to deter litigation practices, but given the current legal climate
it could be used to unfairly penalize litigants that might be classiied as
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"patent rolls. " The existing literature on the award of attorney fees in
patent cases sheds very little light on the problems district courts' reliance
on the deterrence rationale could present. This Essay addresses these prob-
lems and offers practical insights as to when courts should rely on the de-
terrence rationale to award attorney fees. The Essay points out that what
makes a case exceptional should have little to do with the identity of the
parties. In addition, this Essay prescribes that district courts should not
take into account he business model of the parties to justify deterrence as
a rationale for awarding attorney fees.
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The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285, states that "[tihe court in excep-
tional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party."'
Although the language of the statute is simple, applying it has not always
been straightforward.
In 2014, the Supreme Court heard two cases concerning the award
of attorney fees in patent cases. In Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health &
Fitness, Inc., the Supreme Court held that an exceptional case "stands out
from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party's litigating
position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case)
or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated." In doing
so, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit's more rigid test for awarding
attorney fees. Eliminating this rigidity presumably gave district courts
wide discretion and greater flexibility in making their determinations. In
Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., the Supreme
Court clarified that these determinations should be reviewed for abuse of
discretion.'
In the aftermath of Octane Fitness and Highmark, this Essay analyzes
some recent cases concerning the award of attorney fees. The analysis re-
veals that district courts have found cases exceptional where the litigation
strategies or conduct of the losing party distinguished the case from oth-
ers. Further, one rationale courts have used to justify their award of at-
torney fees is that it will deter infringement and unsavory litigation prac-
tices.
However, the deterrence rationale has the potential to be problemat-
ic: its purpose is to deter litigation practices, but given the current legal
climate it could be used to unfairly penalize litigants that could be classi-
fied as "patent trolls." The existing literature on the award of attorney
fees in patent cases sheds very little light on the problems presented by
district courts' reliance on the deterrence rationale. This Essay addresses
these problems and offers practical insights as to when courts should rely
on the deterrence rationale to award attorney fees. The Essay points out
that what makes a case exceptional should have little to do with the iden-
' 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012); see also 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS
§ 20.03[4] [c] [iv] (Matthew Bender 2014) (explaining that in addition to trials, § 285
applies to exceptional appeals).
2 See, e.g., Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L.
REv. 1443, 1449-50 (2014); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts,
Congress, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 279, 293 (2015).
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756
(2014).
Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. CL 1744, 1748 (2014)
(explaining that decisions on matters of discretion are reviewable for abuse of
discretion).
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tity of the parties. In addition, this Essay prescribes that district courts
should not take into account the business model of the parties to justify
deterrence as a rationale for awarding attorney fees.
Only a small amount of doctrinal analysis exists on the impact of the
Supreme Court's recent decisions regarding attorney fees.5 Accordingly,
this Essay sets forth a working framework for how district courts are
awarding attorney fees. Second, it identifies deterrence as a vulnerable
pillar of this framework. That is, if the deterrence rationale is left open to
broad interpretation it could lead to improper results.
In this new legal landscape, district courts no l nger have to adhere
to the rigid Brooks test. Thus, at least initially, it may be more difficult to
predict whether a court will award attorney fees given a particular set of
facts. It is useful to examine recent decisions after Octane Fitness in the
hopes that the outcomes in those cases will provide future guidance to
academics and practitioners.
Part II of this Essay summarizes the history of § 285 and discusses the
Supreme Court's recent decisions in Octane Fitness and Highmark in the
context of the anti-patent troll legal climate. Part III includes three Sec-
tions. The first Section outlines the characteristics of exceptional cases.
The second Section sets forth a preliminary framework for how courts
have decided cases after Octane Fitness. Given that framework, the third
Section explains the danger of relying on a deterrence rationale to award
attorney fees, and argues that the business model of the losing party
should not factor into that determination.
It is too early to say whether a definite pattern has emerged for the
award of attorney fees. However, a close observation of recent cases does
yield some useful information and warnings for practitioners and judges
that can be helpful in future cases.
II. FEE SHIFTING AND PATENT TROLLS
District courts have had the ability to award attorney fees to prevail-
ing parties in patent cases for more than fifty years. This Part briefly
summarizes the evolution of the fee-shifting provision and explains the
current law in the wake of the recent decisions in Octane Fitness and
Highmark. It begins with the relevant history of the statute and discusses
what led to the Supreme Court's decision in Octane Fitness. This Part con-
cludes by characterizing the significance of the Supreme Court's rulings
within the larger policy debate about patent trolls.
' See, e.g., Darin Jones, Note, A Shifting Landscape for Shifting Fees: Attorney-Fee
Awards in Patent Suits After Octane and Highmark, 90 WASH. L. REv. 505, 507 (2015);
Aria Soroudi, Comment, Defeating Trolls: The Impact of Octane and Highmark on Patent
Trolls, 35 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 319, 321 (2015).
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A. Recalibrating the Award ofAttorney Fees
The language of § 285 is simple. However, its application, especially
within the last decade, has been more complex. This Section discusses
changes in how the courts have applied § 285, beginning with its statuto-
ry origin.
1. Statutory Background
In the United States, a court cannot award attorney fees unless au-
thorized by statute or contract.6 In 1946, Congress passed a law that gave
courts authority to award attorney fees to a prevailing party in patent cas-
es.7 The awarding of attorney fees was at the courts' discretion but was
not intended to be a regular occurrence.
The 1952 Patent Act clarified but did not substantively alter Con-
gress's earlier language.9 The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285, succinctly states
that in patent cases "[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasona-
ble attorney fees to the prevailing party."'o As they had done before the
1952 Act, district courts used their discretion in awarding attorney fees by
analyzing various factors to determine if the case was exceptional."
Moreover, until 2005, the Federal Circuit endorsed this totality of the cir-
cumstances approach in awarding attorney fees.'2
2. The Brooks Test and Its Rejection by the Supreme Court
The totality of the circumstances approach that had been applied
since the 1950s was abandoned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit in Brooks Furniture Manufacturing v. Dutailier International3 In
its place, the Federal Circuit set forth a multi-part test for awarding attor-
ney fees. Unfortunately, the test was too complex.
Under the Brooks test, first, a case was exceptional if material inap-
propriate conduct had occurred." Second, a court could award fees
6 See CHISUM, supra note 1, § 20.03[4] [c] [iv] ("[T]he American rule against the
award of attorney fees, in the absence of a statute or compelling circumstances,
developed in order to avoid penalizing parties for asserting their legal rights.").
7 Id. § 20.03 [4] [c] [i].
8 Id. ("Early lower court decisions interpreted the 1946 Act as authorizing an
attorney fee award only upon a specific finding of extraordinary or exceptional
circumstances.").
' Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1753
(2014).
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
See Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1753.
2 See id. at 1754.
3 See Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc. 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2005), overruled by Octane, 134 S. Ct. 1749.
" See id. (explaining that "willful infringement, fraud or inequitable conduct in
procuring the patent, misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation,
conduct that violates Fed.R.Civ.P.11, or like infractions" were examples of material
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against a patentee if the litigation was "brought in subjective bad faith"
and the litigation was "objectively baseless." The Federal Circuit said
that litigation brought in subjective bad faith was litigation that the plain-
tiff knew was objectively baseless." Objectively baseless litigation was liti-
gation that no reasonable litigant would believe would succeed. Finally,
the Federal Circuit said that the offending conduct and a finding that the
case was exceptional had to be proven by clear and convincing evi-
dence."
In the summer of 2014, the Supreme Court characterized the Brooks
test as unduly rigid and rejected the test for several reasons.'9 In Octane
Fitness, the Court found the Brooks test contrary to the language of both
20
the 1946 and 1952 statutes as interpreted by other regional circuits.
First, the Court declared that the conduct named under the Brooks test
consisted of "independently sanctionable conduct."2' Second, the Su-
preme Court asserted that a case might be exceptional if it were just
brought in bad faith or was just objectively baseless." In other words, an
23
exceptional case did not have to be both. In sum, the Supreme Court
24
held that the Brooks test was inconsistent with 35 U.S.C. § 285.
Further, the Supreme Court rejected the clear and convincing evi-
25
dence standard set forth in Brooks. Instead, the Court explained that the
26
correct standard was a preponderance of the evidence standard. In do-
ing so, the Court noted that this was the standard that was traditionally
used in patent litigation.
inappropriate conduct).
5 Id.
m See iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
17 Id. at 1378.
* See Brooks, 393 F.3d at 1382.
1 See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758
(2014); CHISUM, supra note 1, § 20.03 [4] [c] [i] (explaining that the Court also
rejected the Brooks test because it was too high a bar for awarding attorney fees and
would make 35 U.S.C. § 285 superfluous).
20 Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1753-54; CHIsuM, supra note 1, § 20.03 [4] [c] [i].
21 See Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (2014); CHISUM, supra note 1, § 20.03[4] [c] [ii]
(making the distinction that exceptional conduct may not necessarily be
independently sanctionable).
2 See Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1757; CHISUM, supra note 1, § 20.03[4] [c] [ii].
2 Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1757 ("But a case presenting either subjective bad faith or
exceptionally meritless claims may sufficiently set itself apart from mine-run cases to
warrant a fee award.").
24 Id. at 1752-53.





3. Octane Fitness and Identifying an Exceptional Case
In rejecting the Federal Circuit's Brooks test, the Supreme Court's
decision in Octane Fitness reestablished that a determination of whether a
case was exceptional should be based on the totality of the circumstanc-
es. The district court previously denied Octane's motion for attorney
fees, because it reasoned that Octane failed to show that ICON's case was
brought in subjective bad faith or was objectively baseless.2 On appeal,
the Federal Circuit rejected Octane's argument that he test applied by
the district court was too restrictive and upheld the denial of attorney
fees.30
On appeal before the Supreme Court, Octane's arguments were
more persuasive. An exceptional case, said the Court, was "simply one
that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a
party's litigating position (considering both the governing law and the
facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was liti-
gated."3 ' The Court suggested various factors could be considered at the
discretion of the district court including, but not limited to, "frivolous-
ness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and le-
gal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to
advance considerations of compensation and deterrence." The Court
noted that even if a case is exceptional, the awarding of attorney fees is
still within the discretion of the trial court.33 Finally, the Supreme Court
clarified that a preponderance of the evidence standard is the proper
standard in patent litigation, not clear and convincing evidence.m
B. Confirming the Standard of Review
The same day it decided Octane Fitness, the Supreme Court also held
in Highmark that instead of reviewing a district court's decision under
§ 285 de novo, an appellate court should review these decisions for abuse
of discretion.3 5 This rejected the Federal Circuit's previous view, based in
part on the Brooks framework, that the award of attorney fees should be
' Id. at 1756; see also CHISUM, supra note 1, § 20.03[41 [c] [i].
2 ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, No. 09-319 ADM/SER,
2011 WL 3900975, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2011).
* ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 F. App'x 57, 65 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
" Id. at 1756; see also CHISUM, supra note 1, § 20.03[4] [c] [i].
32 Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 n.6; see also CHISUM, supra note 1, § 20.03[4] [c] [i].
" Octane, 134 S. CL at 1755-56; see also Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM,
Inc., 769 F.2d 1578, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1758 (citing Bn6 v.Jeantet, 129 U.S. 683, 688 (1889)).
3 Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1747-49
(2014); see also CHISUM, supra note 1, § 20.03[4] [c] [i].
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reviewed de novo.3" The Supreme Court concluded that since its holding
in Octane Fitness established that the award of attorney fees was at the dis-
cretion of the district court, the findings of the district court must be re-
viewed for abuse of discretion.3 ' Further, the Court explained that some
deference should be given to the district court's determination on ap-
peal.
With the newfound flexibility of Octane Fitness and the more favora-
ble standard of review courtesy of Highmark, some commentators be-
lieved that district courts were equipped with powerful legal tools that
could deter patent troll litigation. The next Section discusses the impact
of the Octane Fitness and Highmark decisions on the broader policy debate
surrounding patent trolls.
C. Awarding Attorney Fees and Patent Trolls
An in-depth discussion on the patent-troll phenomenon is beyond
the scope of this Essay. Instead, this Section accomplishes two goals. First,
it briefly explains the current anti-patent-troll climate and tries to put it
into context Second, it explains why the Supreme Courts' decisions in
Octane Fitness and Highmark, rightly or wrongly, were considered to be
detrimental to patent trolls.
1. The Patent Troll
Thus far, I have avoided defining "patent troll." This is because the
term is hard to define and has different meanings depending on whom
you ask.39 "Patent troll" was first used in 2001 to describe an entity that
instead of commercializing its patented technology chose to license the
technology to others.0 Whatever the definition, there is no doubt that
the term has negative connotations and when it is used, most people are
attempting to define a bad actor.
The danger with most definitions of patent troll is that they are over-
ly broad.4 ' For example, Bessen and Meurer eschew the term patent troll
m Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1747 (explaining that the Federal Circuit viewed
whether litigation was objectively baseless under the Brooks test as a matter of law and
therefore reviewable de novo); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mfg. Sys., Inc., 687
F.3d 1300, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
" Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1748.
" Id.; see also CHISUM, supra note 1, § 20.03[4] [c] [i] (explaining that if a district
court's determination is due to a clearly erroneous interpretation of the law or a
clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence it is an abuse of discretion).
" See Eric Rogers & Young Jeon, Inhibiting Patent Trolling: A New Approach for
Applying Rule 11, 12 Nw.J. TECH & INTELL. PRop. 291, 301 (2014) (acknowledging that
a definition of a patent troll is hard to obtain).
40 Brenda Sandburg, Trolling for Dollars, RECORDER (July 30, 2001), http://www.
therecorder.com/id=900005370205/Trolling-for-Dollars?slreturn=20150911181220.
" See Rogers &Jeon, supra note 39, at 301-02.
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for "non-practicing entity."42 However, their definition includes universi-
ties.4 ' Are non-profit research institutions such as universities bad actors?
Another common definition is based on identifying the revenue
stream of an entity.' The Federal Trade Commission uses the term "pa-
tent assertion entities," and defines the entities as "firms whose business
model primarily focuses on purchasing and asserting patents."1 5 Some of
these "patent assertion entities," such as Conversant, draw a distinction
between their business model and that of a bad actor. Specifically, Con-
versant asserts that there is a difference between a patent-licensing busi-
ness model and a patent-litigation model.
A more sinister variation of this definition explains that a patent troll
48uses the threat and cost of patent litigation to generate revenue. This
Essay is most concerned with this definition, because it provides context
for the Supreme Court's decisions in Octane Fitness and Highmark. The
next Subsection explains how.
2. The Anti-Patent-Troll Climate
The previous Subsection briefly explained how commentators define
"patent troll." Further, it suggested that patent trolls are feared for using
patent litigation or the threat of patent litigation to generate revenue.
There is evidence to suggest that these fears are well founded. Patent liti-
gation is notoriously expensive.9 Further, the patent licensing business
model is a main driver of patent litigation in the U.S.5 Accordingly, poli-
cy makers have made several proposals in an attempt to put an end to pa-
tent trolls.
Of these proposals, the ones that are of interest for the purposes of
this Essay follow from the theory that the U.S. civil procedure system is
responsible for facilitating patent troll litigation.5 ' To counteract this
phenomenon, one commentator has suggested that the application of
" James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs From NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 388 (2014); see also Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing
Entities: Piercing the "Patent Troll" Rhetoric, 47 CONN. L. REv. 435, 443 (2014).
" See Osenga, supra note 42, at 443.
1 See id. at 444 (explaining that "one thing on which they all seem to agree is
that the company's income-or at least a substantial portion of income-comes from
licensing patents rather than inventing, building, or selling something to consumers").
1 FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 8 n.5 (2011).
' Osenga, supra note 42, at 457.
4 Id.
See Rogers &Jeon, supra note 39, at 297; see also Osenga, supra note 42, at 443.
See Bernstein, supra note 2, at 1483 (discussing statistics regarding the cost of
patent litigation).
" See id. at 1469-70 (explaining that "patent assertion entities" filed the most
patent lawsuits in 2012).
" See Rogers &Jeon, supra note 39, at 297.
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Rule 11 be modified to impose sanctions on patent trolls . Several other
suggestions are in the form of legislative proposals. Generally, these pro-
posals attempt to make litigation undesirable for patent trolls and less
risky for defendants by making it more likely that if a patent troll loses at
trial, they will bear the burden of paying for the plaintiffs litigation
53
Costs.
As many of these proposals were being considered or discussed, the
Supreme Court issued its opinions in Octane Fitness and Highmark. There
is evidence to suggest that some interpreted this as the Court's way of
weighing in on the patent troll debate. For example, Soroudi argues
that Octane Fitness and Highmark will hinder patent troll litigation. In-
deed, there is also some empirical evidence suggesting a decline in law-
suits by patent trolls occurred after Octane Fitness and Highmark.5 '
However, the belief that the purpose of Octane Fitness and Highmark is
to stop patent trolls is misguided and dangerous. The belief is misguided
because, as Part III illustrates, thus far the district courts' framework for
awarding attorney fees goes beyond the identity or business models of the
litigants. Further, the belief is dangerous because it may improperly lead
to the award of attorney fees under a deterrence rationale.
III. APPLYING OCTANE HTNESS IN THE ANTI-PATENT-TROLL
ENVIRONMENT
It has been over a year since the Supreme Court's decision in Octane
Fitness and Highmark. This Part examines how district courts have applied
their broad discretion and what circumstances are influencing the court
to determine: (1) that a case is exceptional; and (2) that the court should
award attorney fees to the prevailing party. Given that framework, this
Part also suggests that courts should be careful when relying on a deter-
rence rationale to award attorney fees, and argues that the business mod-
el of the losing party should not factor into that determination.
2 Id. at 315.
" See Soroudi, supra note 5, at 328 (discussing the SHIELD Act of 2013); see also
Rogers & Jeon, supra note 39, at 295, 309-10; Bernstein, supra note 2, at 1450
(arguing that fee shifting is warranted when the prevailing party is an end user).
" SeeJohn F. O'Rourke et al., Silver, Garlic, and Attorney's Fees, ORANGE COUNTY
LAw, Oct. 2014, at 28.
* See Soroudi, supra note 5, at 319.
* See id. at 343-44 (noting a 23% decrease in new patent litigation filings in May
2014 compared to May 2013).
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A. Finding an Exceptional Case
Under 35 U.S.C. § 285, a court may award attorney fees in an excep-
tional patent case to a prevailing party.5 In Octane Fitness, the Supreme
Court held that the determination of whether a case was exceptional was
to be made on a case-by-case basis at the district court's discretion.' The
Court stated that no precise rule existed and only identified "considera-
tions" that the trial court could take into account in making its determi-
nation.9 There is a healthy body of case law before Brooks that describes
how to identify a prevailing party and characterize exceptional cases. This
Section relies in part on that case law to explain who is a prevailing party
and to provide examples of what may make a case exceptional.
1. Identifying the Prevailing Party
There are several ways in which a trial court may identify one party as
having prevailed for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 285. For example, if a
party succeeds in having a claim dismissed with prejudice after discovery,
that party has prevailed.6 Another example of a prevailing party is one
that succeeds in having the asserted patent declared invalid.
Sometimes in complex cases, both parties may prevail on separate is-
sues. In these cases, the trial court has broad discretion as to how to ap-
portion attorney fees.6 ' Cases in which the prevailing patentee is awarded
attorney fees may include instances of "willful or deliberate infringe-
ment"6 or bad faith litigation. Cases in which the accused infringer pre-
vails and is awarded attorney fees generally require bad faith litigation on
the part of the patentee or the commission of fraud or inequitable con-
duct in obtaining the asserted patent.
2. Standing Out from the Rest
In Octane Fitness, the Supreme Court held that an exceptional case is
one that stands out from all the rest." In two ways a case may "stand out":
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
* Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756
(2014).
5 Id.
* See Tenax Corp. v. Tensar Corp., No. H-89-424, 1991 WL 336921, at *3 (D. Md.
Apr. 30, 1991).
" See Manildra Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., 76 F.3d 1178, 1183 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
6 See Dixie Cup Co. v. Paper Container Mfg. Co., 174 F.2d. 834, 836-37 (7th Cir.
1949).
r See Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Corp., 623 F.2d 645, 667 (10th Cir. 1980).
See Cambridge Products, Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients, Inc., 962 F.2d 1048, 1050-51
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
' See Insituform of North America, Inc. v. Midwest Pipeliners, Inc., 780 F.Supp.
479, 491 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Cambridge Products, 962 F.2d at 1050-51.
6 Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756
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(1) the litigation position of the parties; or (2) how the case was litigat-
ed. 7 The Court also made clear that conduct during litigation could
qualify as exceptional even if it was not the type of conduct that would
also be traditionally sanctionable.6
District courts have considered cases exceptional where vexatious lit-
igation has occurred. One example of vexatious litigation is when the
tentee fails to conduct an adequate investigation before filing suit. A
second example of vexatious litigation involves activities that frustrate
discovery such as a party not completely answering interrogatories." Ac-
cordingly, there are numerous examples of conduct that have been char-
acterized as exceptional.
There are also several useful examples of what makes a case not ex-
ceptional. A losing or unsuccessful case is not in itself an exceptional
case. For example, simply because a defendant loses its arguments as to
whether the asserted patent is not infringed and invalid does not make
72
the case exceptional.
In addition, if a party's litigation position is found to be reasonable,
it is unlikely that the case will be characterized as exceptional. Evidence
of a reasonable litigation position may include the fact that the party
made successful arguments related to claim construction. Further, fail-
ing to win ajury verdict is not enough to characterize a litigation position
as unreasonable.
B. Understanding the New Framework for Awarding Attorney Fees
For over a year, district courts have applied the totality of the cir-
cumstances approach, reinstated in Octane Fitness, to determine whether
to award attorney fees to a prevailing party. First, the trial court makes
the initial determination of whether a case is exceptional. Then, the
court must provide its rationale for why it found the case exceptional.
(2014).
17 Id. at 1756.
Id. at 1756-57.
See Eltech Sys. Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 903 F.2d 805, 810 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see
also Loctite Corp v. Fel-Pro, Inc., 667 F.2d 577, 584-85 (7th Cir. 1981) (explaining
that plaintiff used unconfirmed data to initiate a patent infringement suit).
70 See Loctite, 667 F.2d at 584-85.
71 Bianco v. Globus Med., Inc., No. 2:12-CV-00147-WCB, 2014 WL 1904228, at
*2-3 (E.D. Tex. May 12, 2014) (describing a routine unsuccessful claim).
7 See State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
see aso CHISUM, supra note 1, § 20.03 [4] [c] [i].
" See CreAgri, Inc. v. Pinnaclife, Inc., No. 11-CV-6635-LHK, 2014 WL 2508386, at
*10-12 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2014); Stragent, LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 6:11-cv-421, 2014
WL 6756304, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2014).
" Stragent, 2014 WL 6756304 at *5.
7 See Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
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This Section establishes a baseline framework for how district courts
make these determinations. Courts primarily analyze a party's: (1) litiga-
tion position; and (2) litigation conduct to determine whether-in its
discretion-to award attorney fees. The subsections below discuss recent
cases and explain the rationale the court used in coming to its determi-
nation.
1. The Litigation Position of the Losing Party
One factor trial courts examine in determining whether a case is ex-
ceptional is the litigation position of the losing party. This Subsection
provides some recent examples of litigation positions that contributed to
the exceptionality of several cases.
a. Weak Cases
Exceptional cases have been characterized as ones that are so weak
that they are meritless.6 For example, in Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow Agro-
Sciences LLC, the court characterized the plaintiffs theories as contorted
and conclusory." Despite knowing this before filing the lawsuit, the
plaintiff pursued the case.8 Further, the court concluded that the plain-
tiff failed to conduct a sufficient pre-suit investigation since some of the
defendant's best arguments relied on statements made in depositions by
the plaintiffs witnesses."
District courts have also characterized cases where the plaintiff has
no reasonable expectation that they can succeed as exceptional. For ex-
ample, in IPVX Patent Holdings, Inc. v. Voxernet LLC, the plaintiff pursued
a literal infringement claim even though the plaintiff had no expectation
that its literal infringement claim would be successful." In making its de-
termination, the court primarily relied on evidence that the plaintiffs
pre-trial assertions and presentations to the defendant focused solely on a
doctrine of equivalents theory of infringement.8'
1985).
" See Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, No. 12-256 (RMB/JS),
2015 WL 108415, at *4 (D. Del. Jan. 5, 2015).
Id. at *4.
Id. The plaintiff pushed ahead toward trial while unsuccessfully searching for
an argument to trump the defendant's license or contract defense. Id. The court
recognized that losing at summary judgment does not equate to an exceptional case,
but that this case was exceptionally weak because it was built upon "contorted
theor[ies]" and "conjectural conclusions," and only "amount[ed] to distraction." Id.
(quoting Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences, LLC, No. 12-256 (RMB/JS),
2013 WL 5539410, at *7-10 & nn.12-13 (D. Del. Oct 7, 2013)).
7 Id. at *5.
" IPVX Patent Holdings, Inc. v. Voxernet LLC, 5:13-cv-01708 HRL, 2014 WL
5795545, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2014).
1 Id.
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b. Unreasonable Positions
Several cases highlight unreasonable arguments that influenced a
court to conclude that the case was exceptional. For example, in IPVXPa-
tent Holdings the plaintiff proposed an unreasonably broad claim con-
82
struction. Namely, the plaintiffs construction would purportedly cover
a phone made with tin cans.8 The court characterized this construction
as absurd." In Bayer CropScience AG, the court found that one factor that
contributed to it characterizing the case as exceptional was that the plain-
tiffs arguments required the court to suspend reality.85 Similarly, in
Chalumeau Power Systems LLC v. Alcatel-Lucent, the court found that the
plaintiffs argument that an adapter should be equated with the claimed
86
connector" was unreasonable.
A court might also find that a party's failure to adjust its litigation
strategy during a lawsuit makes a case exceptional. In Cambrian Science
Corp. v. Cox Communications, Inc., after receiving a narrow claim construc-
tion, the plaintiff continued to pursue its case based on its preferred
claim construction.8 In fact, the plaintiff provided no evidence to sup-
port infringement of the patent as construed.88
Similarly, a plaintiff taking a position that it knows prior to the law-
suit will fail will likely contribute to a case being characterized as excep-
tional. In Kilopass Technology, despite being cautioned by counsel that the
defendant did not literally infringe its patent, and even after inde-
pendently confirming this was the case, the plaintiff pursued the case on
a literal infringement theory until summary judgment." Another clear
example of an exceptional case may be one where a plaintiff pursues a
claim of patent infringement even when it knows that the defendant does




" Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, No. 12-256 (RMB/JS), 2015
WL 108415, at *5 (D. Del.Jan. 5, 2015).
m Chalumeau Power Sys. LLC v. Alcatel-Lucent, No. 11-1175-RGA, 2014 WL
4675002, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 12, 2014).
8 Cambrian Sci. Corp. v. Cox Commc'ns, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 3d 1111, 1115 (C.D.
Cal. 2015) After this unfavorable ruling, the plaintiff did not move for leave to amend
its infringement contentions, propose an alternative infringement theory, or remove
those infringement contentions; instead, the plaintiff forged ahead with its original
theories even though they could not be supported based on the court's construction.
Id.
, Id. at 1115--16.
8 Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., No. C 10-02066 SI, 2014 WL 3956703, at
*10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2014).
N See Summit Data Sys., LLC v. EMC Corp., No. 10-749-GMS, 2014 WL 4955689,




A party's failure to provide any evidence in support of its arguments
can also make a case exceptional.9' For example, in Kilopass Technology,
Inc. v. Sidense Corp., the plaintiff pursued a claim of infringement based
on the doctrine of equivalents, but its original counsel never engaged in
any analysis to determine if this was a valid theory. The plaintiffs sec-
ond counsel was not given relevant information, and the plaintiff in-
structed its second counsel to quit working before it had finished its anal-
ysis." The doctrine of equivalents theory was ultimately so weak that the
plaintiff changed theories on the eve of trial and failed to follow the
proper procedures to amend its infringement contentions.9' None of the
plaintiffs theories had sufficient support, and they failed to account for
significant differences in the defendant's technology.5
Defendants have also been held responsible for failing to support
their arguments with sufficient evidence. In Homeland Housewares, LLC v.
Sorensen Research, the defendant "appeared unprepared or unwilling to
satisfy its burden" at summary judgment.9 Sorenson repeatedly attacked
Homeland's evidence, but failed to produce any evidence of infringe-
ment.97 The trial court stated: "[A]fter more than a year of opportunities
to take discovery and run tests, Sorensen [had] presented no evidence
whatsoever ... and [had] not even suggested what type of evidence it
might present in that regard."9"
A party's inability to provide sufficient evidence may be related to
how it conducted its pre-suit investigation. The plaintiffs failure to per-
form an adequate pre-suit investigation is a factor that contributes to a
case being found exceptional. For example, in Yufa v. TSI, Inc., the court
noted that the plaintiff relied solely on advertising to support its in-
" See IPVX, 2014 WL 5795545 at *5 (The plaintiff failed to provide a "person of
ordinary skill in the art" linking the allegedly infringing product to the claims, which
made its claims baseless. The court then concluded that "[failing to develop any
evidence to support an infringement position" makes the case exceptional.).
' Kilopass, 2014 WL 3956703, at *11.
1 Id. at *11-12.
Id. at *13.
*Id. at *14.
6 See Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Sorensen Research & Dev. Tr., 581 F. App'x
877, 881 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
97 Id.
8 Id. (alterations and omission in original) (quoting Homeland Housewares,
LLC v. Sorensen Research & Dev. Tr., No. CV-11-3720-GW(JEMx), slip op. at 16 (C.D.
Cal. August 23, 2012), ECF No. 140).
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fringement theories." Further, the plaintiff failed to test the defendant's
products.
d. Inconsistency
Finally, inconsistency in a party's argument is another factor that
may cause a court to find a case exceptional. In Kilopass Technology, the
plaintiff took a position at the district court that was inconsistent with the
position it took at the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.o' The
plaintiff argued that the inconsistency was due in part to a protective or-
der.'o2 The court disagreed and characterized these inconsistent argu-
ments as gamesmanship.0 3
2. The Litigation Conduct of the Losing Party
The previous Subsection discussed cases where a legal position taken
by one of the parties contributed to the case being characterized as ex-
ceptional. Courts may also find a case exceptional due to the conduct of
the litigants. This conduct includes a broad range of behavior. The fol-
lowing discussion provides some examples of recent conduct that courts
found exceptional.
a. Unwillingness to Spend Resources
Cases that have recently been described as exceptional include in-
stances where the court has noted that the litigants demonstrated a lack
of effort or extraordinary unwillingness to spend resources during the
course of litigation. In IPVX Patent Holdings, the court noted that the
plaintiff failed to "expend the resources necessary to support its positions
on infringement."4 For example, the plaintiff did not conduct a pre-suit
investigation and reused claim construction briefs from other cases that
involved products that were different from the allegedly infringing prod-
ucts.1os The court in Chalumeau Power also found the plaintiff's pre-suit in-
vestigation inadequate for several reasons.'0o Specifically, the plaintiffs
arguments relied solely on public documents, it did not thoroughly vet
the accused product families, and its expert failed to review the defend-
ant's central technical documents until after claim construction. 1o
" SeeYufa v. TSI, Inc., No. 09-cv-01315-KAW, 2014 WL 4071902, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 14, 2014).
100 Id.
o' Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., No. C 10-02066 SI, 2014 WL 3956703, at
*10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2014).
102 Id.
10 Id.
1' IPVX Patent Holdings, Inc. v. Voxernet LLC, 5:13-cv-01708 HRL, 2014 WL
5795545, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2014).
10 See id.
' Chalumeau Power Sys. LLC v. Alcatel-Lucent, No. 11-1175-RGA, 2014 WL
4675002, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 12, 2014).
1o7 See id. at *1-2.
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b. Conduct During Discovery
Conduct during discovery can also trigger a determination by a court
that the case is exceptional. In particular, burdensome discovery has
been found to be exceptional. For example, in Cambrian Science Corp., the
court discussed that not only was the discovery the plaintiff requested
burdensome because of the large amount of data involved, but it was also
unjustified because the plaintiff did not intend to use the information it
acquired with respect to these burdensome requests.
c. Gamesmanship
In several cases, courts have asserted that gamesmanship or misrep-
resentation on the behalf of the losing party contributed to the excep-
tionality of a case and warranted the award of attorney fees. In Kilopass
Technology, the plaintiff made arguments at the district court that were ir-
reconcilable with arguments it had previously made during a BPAI hear-
ing.'0" The court characterized this action as gamesmanship."o Another
court described a plaintiffs conduct as a misrepresentation when the
plaintiff implied that a terminal disclaimer had been filed when in fact it
did not exist."'
d. Improper Motives
Finally, courts have characterized a case as exceptional based on the
motives of the losing party. For example, in Chalumeau Power, the court
held that the plaintiffs conduct was exceptional because there was evi-
dence that it minimized its costs in an attempt to extort a settlement."2
Similarly, in Cambrian Science Corp., the court concluded that the purpose
of the plaintiffs lawsuit was to extract an early settlement from the de-
fendant because it sued presumably weak parties."3 The defendants were
customers of a larger company who had negotiated with the plaintiffs
predecessor-in-interest about the asserted patent.
C. Awarding Attorney Fees to Deter Future Lawsuits
The previous Section discussed cases where the legal arguments and
litigation conduct of the parties contributed to the court's finding of an
exceptional case. Courts may also award attorney fees in exceptional cas-
' See Cambrian Sci. Corp. v. Cox Commc'ns, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 3d 1111, 1117-18
(C.D. Cal. 2015).
' Kilopass Tech. Inc. v. Sidense Corp., No. C 10-02066 SI, 2014 WL 3956703, at
*10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2014).
[oId.
. Logic Devices, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. C 13-02943 WHA, 2014 WL 6844821, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2014).
1' Chalumeau, 2014 WL 4675002 at *3.
" Cambrian, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 1117.
" Id.
2016] 297
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
es in part to deter similar conduct from reoccurring in future litigation,
to deter patent infringement, or groundless litigation."'
However, the deterrence rationale has the potential to be problemat-
ic: its purpose is to deter litigation practices, but given the current legal
climate it could also be used to unfairly penalize litigants that might be
improperly classified as patent trolls. Accordingly, this Section explains
how courts have used deterrence as a rationale for awarding attorney fees
in recent cases, and argues that courts should be cautious when relying
on deterrence alone as a rationale for awarding attorney fees. Specifical-
ly, what makes a case exceptional should have little to do with the busi-
ness model of the losing party.
1. Deterring Behavior
A court may award attorney fees to a prevailing party in order to dis-
courage the losing party from engaging in similar behavior in the future.
For example, in Summit Data Systems, LLC v. EMC Corp., the court charac-
terized the plaintiffs pattern of behavior as exceptional."'6 Specifically,
the plaintiffs practice was to obtain settlements for less than what it
would cost for a defendant to litigate."' The court awarded attorney fees
to the prevailing defendant in order to discourage the plaintiff from pur-
suing similarly frivolous lawsuits.'1 8
In some instances, a quick settlement strategy incentivizes the plain-
tiff to be as economical as possible during the early stages of litigation.
However, courts have awarded attorney fees to deter plaintiffs from liti-
gating cases in a way that is designed to spend as little money as possible
in an attempt to extract a settlement from the accused infringer."' For
example, in JPVX Patent Holdings, the court awarded attorney fees in part
to discourage the plaintiffs from filing future lawsuits."2 The court
opined that evidence showed that IPVX was not willing to spend the nec-
essary resources on a patent infringement case. Thus, in the courts
view, awarding attorney fees to the defendants would deter similar litiga-
tion.
"' See CHIsuM, supra note 1, § 20.03 [4] [c].
6 Summit Data Sys., LLC v. EMC Corp., No. 10-749-GMS, 2014 WL 4955689, at
*4 (D. Del. Sept. 25, 2014).
117 Id.
11 Id. at *5.
See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. CL 1749, 1756
(2014); see also IPVX Patent Holdings, Inc. v. Voxernet LLC, 5:13-cv-01708 HRL, 2014
WL 5795545, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2014); Chalumeau Power Sys. LLC v. Alcatel-
Lucent, No. 11-1175-RGA, 2014 WL 4675002, at *3 (D. Del. Sept. 12, 2014).
J' IPVX, 2014 WL 5795545, at *7 (explaining that a final, stand-alone reason the






As demonstrated by the previous examples, what makes a case excep-
tional generally has little to do with the identity of the parties. However,
one example of a case that, if misinterpreted, could lead to improper re-
sults in future cases is Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc.'" There, the court
awarded attorney fees to a prevailing patentee. The plaintiff, Romag
Fasteners, was a small company that sued a much larger company for pa-
tent infringement. The plaintiff prevailed and the court awarded attor-
ney fees due in part to the defendant's attempt to prolong the litigation
so that the cost of pursuing the lawsuit for the plaintiff increased signifi-
cantly.'2 5 Further, the court explained that the plaintiffs patent was vital
to its business, and therefore, they should not be discouraged from pur-
suing a lawsuit. 1
The court's first reason in support of awarding attorney fees is closely
related to the defendant's litigation behavior during the trial. As set forth
in Section III.B.2, this rationale squarely fits within the exceptional case
framework.
However, the court's second rationale-that "plaintiffs similar to
Romag" should not be discouraged from filing infringement lawsuits-
seems to be based on the identity of the plaintiff. This rationale is out-
side the framework detailed in Section III.B.2. Plaintiffs "similar to Ro-
mag" are likely small companies. However, the relative size or identity of
a party was not among the various factors the Supreme Court suggested
be considered in Octane Fitness.
In the current anti-patent-troll environment, coupling the deter-
rence rationale with the identity of plaintiffs or defendants could be ex-
tremely problematic. One commentator has interpreted the Supreme
Court's decisions in Octane Fitness and Highmark as a response to the per-
ceived patent troll problem." But, Professor Osenga warns that judicial
solutions to the patent troll problem must not harm businesses that use
patent licensing as a business model.12
Accordingly, district courts should not take into account the business
model of the parties to justify deterrence as a rationale for awarding at-
2 See generally Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-1827 (JBA), 2014
WL 4073204 (D. Conn. Aug. 14, 2014).
Id.at*11.
21 See id. at *1.
'2' See id. at *4.
16Id.
Id. at *4.
See Osenga, supra note 42, at 438 (explaining that a commonly understood
definition of a patent troll is a company or individual that uses patent lawsuits to
extort money from manufacturers and other companies that make commercial
products).
'2 See id. at 441.
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torney fees. As mentioned earlier in this Essay, patent trolls are hard to
define. The reality is that patentees generally have two options for gener-
ating revenue: (1) commercialize their invention; or (2) license their in-
vention. Commercializing a product is notoriously difficult. * Thus, many
companies resort to licensing their patents as a way to generate reve-
nue.
Using the threat of fee shifting to combat patent trolls could mistak-
enly harm litigants that use patent licensing to generate revenue. This
could include staple American firms such as GE or IBM. Thus, it is the
exceptional behavior of non-practicing entities that should be determina-
tive in awarding attorney fees to a prevailing party, not their identity or
business model. In support of this notion, several commentators have
argued that any fee shifting by the court should be based on its analysis of
the parties' conduct.3 Moreover, the threat of the award of attorney fees
will not stop patent trolls because their business model relies on settling
lawsuits, not litigating them to final disposition."'
Thus far, there seems to be no reason to sound an alarm. District
court decisions based on Octane Fitness are still relatively new. Further,
district courts seem to be making determinations based on behavior and
not identity. For example, in Rates Technology Inc. v. Broadvox Holding Co.,
the district court indicated that it would not award attorney fees to the
defendant just because the plaintiff was a "hyper-litigious non-practicing
entity."136
But, those that care about the patent system and U.S. innovation
must remain vigilant. First, we must sort through all the anti-patent-troll
rhetoric to understand the many ways in which companies can use pa-
tents. With that understanding, we must make sure that the legal tools at
the system's disposal are used in a correct and responsible manner.
V. CONCLUSION
In the wake of Octane Fitness and Highmark, district courts have exer-
cised broad discretion in awarding attorney fees in exceptional cases.
13 See id. at 445-46.
See id. at 465 (explaining that NTP licensed its patents only after failing to
commercialize its technology).
133 See id. at 440 (identifying IBM and GE as "former manufacturing entities" that
in addition to commercializing products in the past, rely on patent licensing for
revenue).
1" See id. at 478-79 (arguing that fee-shifting proposals should not be based on
overbroad characterizations of companies as patent trolls).
13 See Rogers &Jeon, supra note 39, at 304-05, 307.
131 See Soroudi, supra note 5, at 327.
' Rates Tech. Inc. v. Broadvox Holding Co., 56 F. Supp. 3d 515, 533 (S.D.N.Y.
2014).
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Circumstances that courts have found exceptional include parties assert-
ing unreasonable litigation positions and litigation conduct that stands
out from other cases. In addition, courts have stated that awarding attor-
ney fees will deter similar conduct in future cases or prevent a plaintiff
from pursuing certain cases at all.
This Essay has attempted to explain that in the current anti-patent-
troll climate, a misunderstanding of the deterrence rationale could be
used to misguidedly combat patent trolls. However, the patent-troll label
can be easily assigned to companies of all types that may choose to li-
cense their patents instead of commercialize them. Thus, properly ap-
plied, the award of attorney fees should primarily be used to deter unde-
sirable litigation conduct, and not to impede the use of patent licensing
as a business model.

